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Employment Discrimination-REVERSE DISCRIMINATION- 
PRIVATELY INSTIGATED RACIAL QUOTAS A  ACCEPTABLE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION-United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). 
Between 1969 and 1974 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 
had been hiring blacks and whites one-for-one at  the hiring gate 
in an effort to balance the racial makeup of the production work 
force a t  each of its plants with the racial makeup of the work force 
in each community where a plant was located.'   his practice 
would eventually have balanced both production lines and senior- 
ity lists, and would also have infused some black workers into 
Kaiser's craft positions under normal seniority bidding practices 
over a period of years. However, the hiring practice resulted in 
increasing production force minority representation by only 
about 1% a year a t  the Gramercy, Louisiana, plant. Roughly 15% 
of that plant's work force was made up of blacks by 1974,2 while 
39% of the available work force in the community was black. 
Racial balance in craft positions was almost nonexistent a t  the 
Gramercy plant by 19742 
In 1974 the United Steelworkers and Kaiser agreed upon an 
affirmative action plan aimed at balancing the percentage of 
black craft workers more effectively with the percentage of blacks 
available in the local work force.' Prior to the instigation of the 
plan neither blacks nor whites had been able to train for craft 
positions on the job at Kaiser. The new program afforded both 
racial groups a new opportunity, in the form of on-the-job craft 
training. Craft trainees were to be selected from among produc- 
tion workers on a seniority basis, but a t  least fifty percent of the 
trainees were to be black. This meant that a different seniority 
standard would be allowed for blacks, permitting them to bid for 
the craft program with less seniority than that required of white 
workers .5 
During 1974 Kaiser selected thirteen employees for the pro- 
gram a t  its Gramercy plant.' Seven of the selected trainees were 
1. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 
(1979). 
2. Id. See also 99 S. Ct. a t  2725. Prior to 1974 only 1.83% of the skilled workers in 
craft positions a t  Gramercy were black. 
3. Record a t  62, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. 
La. 1976). 
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2725. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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black and six were white. Brian Weber, a white production worker 
who had bid on three trainee positions, was rejected for admission 
even though he had more seniority than the most junior black 
selected. Weber instituted a class action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of 
himself and all similarly situated white workers, alleging viola- 
tion of sections 703(a) and (d) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.' 
The district court held that Title VII prohibits racial quotas 
for on-the-job training programs except where such quotas are 
court-ordered remedies for proven discrimination? In Weber v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical C0rp.l the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The United States Su- 
preme Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit and upheld the 
affirmative action plan.1° 
A. Title VII and the "Make Whole" Doctrine 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids unequal 
treatment of employees and prospective employees on the basis 
of race, sex, religion, or national origin" and applies to both the 
private and public sectors." The Equal Employment Opportun- 
ity Commission (EEOC) has power to promulgate and enforce 
equal employment guidelines under Title VII.13 
Title VII and the EEOC guidelines both seek to place victims 
of discrimination in the position of employment they would have 
reached if there had been no discrimination.14 This concept, 
known as the "make whole" doctrine, has been limited to those 
situations in which some definite, intentional, and discriminatory 
act by the employer is shown,15 or to instances where in the ab- 
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d) (1976). 
8. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976). 
9. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). 
10. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Justice Powell and Justice 
Stevens did not participate in the decision. Five justices voted to validate the Kaiser plan; 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate 
opinion in which he concurred with the majority's opinion and result. 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§  2000e-1 to 9 (1976). 
12. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1974); 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-16 (1976). 
13. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-4 (1976). The guidelines are located at 29 C.F.R. 00  1600.735- 
1610.36 (1979). Part 1608, dealing with race and affirmative action, was added Jan. 16, 
1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 4425 (1979). 
14. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975). 
15. Id. See also Comment, How Far Can Affirmative Action Go Before it Becomes 
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sence of definite discrimination, statistical disparity provides a 
prima facie finding of racial animus under Title VII.16 Even where 
the disparity is the result of a lack of experienced craft workers, 
which was the case a t  Kaiser's Gramercy plant, it can form the 
basis for a finding of employment discrimination.17 
B. Executive Order No. 11,246 
Following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, President 
Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11,246, which mandated af- 
firmative action by any employer holding or operating under a 
government contract.lR Broadened by President Nixon,Ig Execu- 
tive Order No. 11,246 is now enforced by the EEOC and the Office 
of Federal Contract C o m p l i a n ~ e . ~ ~  Since the Executive Order re- 
quires government contractors to affirmatively develop plans for 
achieving racial equality in employment practices, it created a 
potential conflict for those employers in light of Title VII's appar- 
ent ban against race-conscious remedies other than those ordered 
by a On one hand, a contractor risked the loss of his 
government contracts if he failed to comply with EEOC guide- 
lines. On the other hand, he risked liability for reverse discrimi- 
nation if compliance resulted in race-conscious action that vio- 
lated the rights of white employees under Title VII. 
Under pressure from the Office of Federal Contract Compli- 
ance, Kaiser would have had reason to fear the loss of valuable 
government contracts. Kaiser's effort to achieve racial balance by 
hiring one-for-one a t  the gate might well have been interpreted 
Reverse Discrimination?, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 513, 541-45 (1977). 
16. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38, 360 
(1977). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) 
(statistical disparities subject to rebuttal by employer). 
17. 41 C.F.R. 8 60-2 (1979). See also Record a t  92-93, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976); Clark, The Creation of the Newark Plan, 
23 CATH. U.L. REV. 443, 466-67 (1974); [I9761 1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) fl 1380. 
18. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. fi 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. !i 2000e 
app., a t  1232 (1976). 
19. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. fi 803 (1969), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. !i 2000e 
app., a t  1236 (1976). 
20. 41 C.F.R. 4 60-1.1 (1979). 
21. 563 F.2d at 228-30 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). For a concise analysis of the conflict 
between Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246, see Note, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum 
& Chemical Corporation: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 112462, 57 N.C.L. REV. 
695 (1978). 
The conflict between Executive Order No. 11,246 and Title VII was not immediately 
apparent. Weber is the first case in which the Supreme Court has directly faced the issue 
of reverse discrimination in light of voluntary private affirmative action programs. 
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as an insufficient effort under the guidelines, since only limited 
opportunities for blacks were available in the crafts by 1974. 
C.  Title VII and Majority Rights 
Prior to Weber there were indications that Title VII might 
prohibit some voluntary private affirmative action plans. Two 
Supreme Court cases indicated that Title V11 was not necessarily 
limited to the protection of minority employees. In 1971, in Griggs 
v. D&e Power Co.,= the Court considered the validity of ability 
tests for employees under section 703(h) of Title VII. Although 
Griggs did not involve an affirmative action program, the Court 
did note that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minor- 
ity or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has pro- 
scribed" in Title VII.23 
An even clearer indication came in McDonald u. Santa Fe 
Trail Transportation Co. 24 In McDonald two white employees of 
the Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. were fired for stealing 
cargo, but a black employee charged in the same incident was not 
fired. The discharged white employees subsequently accused the 
company of discrimination under Title VII. Again no affirmative 
action program was at issue, but in holding for the white employ- 
ees the Court stated: 
[Tlhe EEOC, whose interpretations are entitled to great defer- 
ence, has consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial 
discrimination in private employment against whites on the 
same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites . . . . 
This conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative his- 
tory to the effect that Title VII was intended to "cover white 
men and white women and all Americans . . ." and create an 
"obligation not to discriminate against whites." We therefore 
hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against 
the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as 
would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson [the black 
employee] white.25 
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
23. Id. at 431. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist cited this language 
from Griggs in their dissenting opinions in Weber. 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissent- 
ing); id. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also cited language to the 
same effect from Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 99 S. Ct. at 2736 
(Rehnquist, J. ,  dissenting) (quoting 438 U.S. at 579). This language from Furnco was 
based upon the language from Griggs. 
24. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
25. Id. at 279-80 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Neither Griggs nor McDonald forced the Court to weigh af- 
firmative action designed to correct discrimination against rights 
and expectations of white workers, but the rationale of those two 
cases set the stage for such a confrontation. 
Weber presented the issue of whether Title VII prohibits all 
voluntary, private racial quotas designed to hasten the elimina- 
tion of the effects of past societal discriminati~n.~'% holding that 
Title VII did not prohibit all such quotas, the Court reasoned that 
the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII was to hasten minor- 
ity equality in employment opportunities. The Kaiser plan, it 
held, was consistent with this purpose.z7 The Court further justi- 
fied its holding by pointing out that the Kaiser plan "does not 
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees" by 
requiring their discharge or completely barring their advance- 
ment.2R In addition, the Court noted that since Kaiser's preferen- 
tial selection of blacks was to end when the desired percentage of 
black craft workers was reached, the plan was only temporary and 
was not intended to "maintain racial i m b a l a n ~ e . " ~ ~  
Concurring, Justice Blackmun viewed the Kaiser plan with 
approval because "the craft training program [was] new and 
[did] not involve an abrogation of pre-existing seniority 
rights."30 In his view, the Kaiser plan was a justifiable response 
to statistical disparities that arguably constituted a Title VII 
~iola t ion.~ '  Furthermore, Justice Blackmun saw a need to resolve 
the conflict created by Title VII and the EEOC guidelines. While 
he would have preferred a different approach-one of allowing 
restrictive, private, voluntary affirmative action programs only 
when an arguable violation of law was present-Justice Black- 
mun was still willing to join the majority to resolve the conflict.3z 
Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger in a 
dissent that focused upon congressional intent.33 Unable to agree 
that Congress endorsed in Title VII any form of race-conscious 
action except as a remedy for a specific finding of discrimination, 
26. 99 S. Ct. at 2724-25. 
27. Id. at 2730. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
31. Id. at 2731-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 2734-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Rehnquist reasoned from Griggs and McDonald that Title 
VII did not permit employers to voluntarily prefer racial minori- 
ties.34 In his view the only intent of Title VII was to present "a 
flat prohibition on discrimination 'against any individual . . . 
because of such individual's race . . . . 3 9935 
The Court did not "define in detail the line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action 
plans," but merely held that the Kaiser "affirmative action plan 
falls on the permissible side of the line."3Wevertheless, an analy- 
sis of the Court's justifications for its holding sheds some light on 
where that line might ultimately be drawn. 
A. Justifications 
The Weber majority relied on the fact that the goal of the 
Kaiser plan was to achieve racial balance with haste.37 It viewed 
this goal as consistent with congressional intent in Title VII.38 
Thus a voluntarily adopted plan instigated to "hasten the elimi- 
nation"39 of the effects of past societal discrimination would likely 
comport with the Court's view of permissible affirmative action. 
In order to achieve racial balance rapidly, the Kaiser plan 
created a new, dual seniority system, which arguably disrupted 
the seniority expectations of white employees and diluted the 
plant-wide seniority to which white workers had looked for up- 
ward mobility. Since Title VII might prohibit the disruption of 
such expectations because of race, and since the courts have 
tended to protect Title VII rights against disruption by the collec- 
tive bargaining process,40 the Court in Weber attempted to fur- 
ther justify its potentially harsh result by concluding that the 
34. Id. at  2736-37, 2748 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. a t  2748-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-2(a) (1976)). 
36. Id. at  2730. 
37. Id. at  2728. 
38. The opinion cited comments by Senators Humphrey, Carlson, Javits, Miller, 
Dirksen, Allott, Kennedy, and Clark to illustrate its view of congressional intent in Title 
VII. Id. a t  2727-29 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 6547 passim (1964)). The majority also examined 
the language of Title VII and the accompanying House report. Id. a t  2728 (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)). 
39. Id. a t  2728. 
40. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51(1974). See also TWA v. Hardi- 
son, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). 
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plan was merely temporary." This conclusion deserves a closer 
look. 
The union claimed that the fifty percent quota, which neces- 
sitated a dual seniority system, would end when racial balance 
was achieved." The Court appears to have accepted this claim 
without careful consideration. It is likely that some quota for 
black craft trainees will remain long after racial balance is ini- 
tially reached. The percentage of blacks entering the training 
program will be higher in relation to the in-plant black work force 
than the percentage of white trainees in relation the the in-plant 
white work force. This will perpetuate a black seniority deficiency 
in the non-craft, in-plant work force." As a result, black workers 
in a collapsed single seniority system would be unable to compete 
effectively with whites and the proportion of black craft trainees 
would soon fall below acceptable EEOC guildeline levels. It 
41. Both the majority and concurring opinions took comfort in the temporariness of 
the plan. 
Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial 
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selec- 
tion of craft trainees a t  the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage 
of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the per- 
centage of blacks in the local labor force. 
99 S. Ct. a t  2730. "[TJhe program . . . ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft 
work force matches the racial composition of the local population. It thus operates as a 
temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without attempting to 'maintain' a 
previously achieved balance." Id. a t  2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
42. In its brief the union stated: 
We italicize the word "temporary" to assure that there is no misunderstan- 
ding as to the nature of the program at  issue. Respondent's [Weber's] brief 
states that the 1974 agreement mandates quota selection even after the existing 
imbalance has been eliminated. But the 1974 agreement expressly provides that 
this procedure shall apply only "until the goal is reached." Thus the program 
is addressed to eliminating an existing racial imbalance, not to establishing 
racial balance as a permanent criterion. What is a t  stake here is the legality of 
this program and not the legality of a program which establishes a racial quota 
as a permanent selection criterion. 
Reply Brief for United Steelworkers of America a t  5, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. 
Ct. 2721 (1979) (footnotes and citations omitted). The union failed to explain how Kaiser 
would be able to continue compliance with EEOC guidelines and regulations without 
maintaining some quotas indefinitely. The assumption was that a t  some time in the future 
the problem would simply be corrected by the plan. 
43. To illustrate, suppose Kaiser had 100 employees, 10 of whom were black. If it 
separated its employees into two seniority lists, with 90 whites in one list and 10 blacks 
in the other, and if it drew equally from each list, the shorter list would be reduced by 
one-tenth when the first worker was taken from it, while the longer list would be reduced 
by one-ninetieth. After ten years, taking one man from each list per year, the black list 
would be completely turned over, and the black with the most seniority on the list could 
have no more than ten years of seniority. The white list, however, would have lost only 
ten workers out of ninety, and many of the remaining white workers could easily have 
accumulated much more than ten years of seniority. 
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would then be necessary to reinstitute a quota system. Kaiser 
itself recognized this possibility: 
If and when the goal is reached, a percentage quota reflecting 
the percentage of minority workers in the overall labor force will 
be established for the training programs. This quota is expected 
to be used indefinitely to assure perpetual "minority representa- 
tion in the plant that is equal to that representation in the 
community work force p~pula t ion ."~~  
There is a measure of irony in the Court's validation of the 
Kaiser plan. Evidence at  trial established that employees hired 
at the 1974 gate would amass enough seniority under the old 
seniority system in' fifteen to twenty years to compete for craft 
training." Assuming the competitive position of blacks hired in 
1969 was similar, those blacks might be able to bid on craft train- 
ing slots effectively by 1984. Thus the Kaiser plan begins to place 
blacks in the crafts perhaps no more than ten years earlier than 
the old system, but by Kaiser's own admission, it established a 
race-conscious system that will last a t  least thirty years, and 
could last much longer. In the words of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent, in order to achieve haste in eliminating the last vestiges 
of past societal discrimination, the Court has "introduce[d] into 
Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that the law was intended 
to e rad i~a te . "~~ 
B. The Future of Voluntary Affirmative Plans 
The impact of Title VII on future affirmative action plans 
concerns both employers and employees. Weber offered belea- 
guered employers some relief from the apparent conflict between 
Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246 by allowing employers 
to use statistical disparity and racial imbalance as a justification 
for creating racial quotas in training programs.47 Weber left em- 
ployers, however, with a significant measure of uncertainty, and 
employers planning new affirmative action programs must still be 
cognizant of the rights of white workers. 
At least three questions remain after Weber: (1) Would the 
44. Brief for Respondents at 4, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S .  Ct. 2721 (1979) 
(quoting Record at 66 (testimony of Dennis E. English, Industrial Relations Superintend- 
ent at the Gramercy plant, Apr. 1, 1975)). 
45. Record at 92-93. 
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2753 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
47. See id. at 2729 (Congress intended to allow affirmative action plans designed to 
correct racially imbalanced work forces). 
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Court construe Title VII to prohibit a voluntary plan that re- 
quired the discharge or absolutely barred the advancement of 
white employees? (2) Would a plan that provided a manifestly 
permanent quota be unacceptable under Title VII? (3) Would a 
plan that altered an established seniority system be prohibited? 
Since the Kaiser plan actually offered both black and white 
workers a new chance for a d v a n ~ e m e n t , ~ ~  a plan that required the 
discharge or barred the advancement of white employees would 
probably be viewed differently by the C o ~ r t . ' ~  Given the plain 
language of Title VIISO and the Court's language in McDonald and 
Grigg~,~'  it is likely that the Court would find such a plan unac- 
ceptable. 
What the Court would do with a permanent quota is less 
clear. The argument that the Kaiser plan would not be perma- 
nenv2 seemed to affect the Court's decision in Weber. " Since the 
Court was apparently not influenced by the longevity of the plan 
and its effect upon a full generation of white workers, it is difficult 
to predict just how the Court would view a manifestly permanent 
quota system. 
Given the implicit policy in Title VII of achieving racial bal- 
a n ~ e , ~ ~  however, the Court should find a manifestly permanent 
quota system unacceptable. Nothing in Title VII requires or even 
implicitly condones the permanent unequal treatment of blacks 
and whites. 
The third question, dealing with change in seniority systems, 
presents a difficult problem. Seniority patterns were unquestion- 
ably changed at  Gramercy, but the change was in a completely 
new training program.55 The Court apparently felt that old expec- 
48. See text accompanying note 5 supra. 
49. See 99 S. Ct. a t  2730. 
50. The statute declares: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organiza- 
tion, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate 
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide . . . 
training. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976). 
51. 427 U.S. at  279-80; 401 U.S. a t  431. 
52. See notes 41-42 supra. 
53. The only place where the temporariness argument was pointedly argued was in 
the union's reply brief. That both the majority and concurring opinions mention the issue 
as partial justification for the holding indicates that the union's argument was somewhat 
persuasive. See 99 S. Ct. a t  2730; id. a t  2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
54. See id. at  2728-29. 
55. Id. a t  2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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tations had no force in a new program. A plan that deprived white 
workers of seniority expectations in an established program would 
likely violate Title VII. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Weber majority saw the Kaiser plan as a reasonable 
response to the problem of employment discrimination, consis- 
tent with Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII. The goal of 
hastening minority participation in employment areas previously 
closed to minorities and the supposedly temporary nature of the 
plan were seen by the Court as justifications for its holding. 
Weber only gives general guidelines as to which voluntary 
affirmative action plans might be permissible, and many ques- 
tions remain unanswered. However, it seems that Title VII would 
prohibit race-conscious quotas in private, voluntary affirmative 
action plans if the imposition of quotas would unduly trammel 
established majority rights. New plans must therefore continue 
to tread lightly where the employment expectations of white 
workers are involved. 
Stephen A. Van Dyke 
